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THE ABORTION DECISION FOR MINNESOTA MINORS:
WHO DECIDES?
The constitutional protections afforded minors are often subject to limtations not
applied to protection afforded adults because minors may be constiered too immature
to make important decisions. Although the state must have a compelling interest to
infringe upon an adult's decision to obtain an abortion, the state need only a signifi-
cant interest to interfere with a similar decision by a minor. The Minnesota legis-
lature has nearly eliminated a teenager's right to privacy in making a decision
about abortion. This Note evaluates Minnesota's abortion law, Minnesota Stat-
utes section 144.313, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, and concludes the
statute may be constitutionally invalid
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 194
II. HISTORICAL BASIS OF CURRENT ABORTION LAWS ......... 197
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MINNESOTA STATUTE
SECTION 144.343 ......................................... 205
A. Parental Notification Requirement ......................... 205
1. Interests of Parent, Child, and State ................... 205
2. Additional Repercussions ............................. 209
B. The Bypass Procedure ................................... 212
IV . CONCLUSION . ............................................. 215
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, there were 19,028 abortions performed in Minnesota.1 Ap-
proximately 14.3%, or 2,733, of these abortions were performed on teen-
agers under the age of eighteen. 2 These individuals represent a class
affected by the new Minnesota criminal abortion statute3 requiring
mandatory notification by the physician or his agent to the parents of an
unemancipated minor. Prior to the enactment of the parental notifica-
tion statute, the applicable abortion statute, Minnesota Statutes section
1. Affidavit of Jane Hodgson, M.D., at para. 33, Hodgson v. State, 3-81 Civ. No. 538
(D. Minn. filed July 30, 1981). Thomas Webber, Director of Planned Parenthood of Min-
nesota, stated that 16,490 Minnesotans had abortions in 1980; of those, 5,603 were under
the age of 19. According to Planned Parenthood, there were approximately 15,490 abor-
tions performed on Minnesotans in 1982, a decline of 1000 procedures. Approximately
eight out of ten, of the decline, were for those under age 17. Minneapolis Star & Tribune,
June 16, 1983 at 10A, cols. 5-6.
2. Affidavit of Jane Hodgson, M.D.,supra note 1, at para. 33. Approximately 84% of
all teenage abortions performed in Minnesota in 1980 were of teenagers either age seven-
teen or sixteen. Id. at para. 25. Therefore, this statute affects primarily older teenagers.
3. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(2) (1982) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13.02, subdivision 8, no abortion oper-
ation shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor or upon a woman for
whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed pursuant to sections 525.54
to 525.551 because of a finding of incompetency, until at least 48 hours after
1
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144.343(1), did not require consent by or notification to the minor's par-
ents. 4 In May of 1981, the legislature restricted the application of Min-
nesota Statutes section 144.343, subdivision 1, by adding provisions that
affect the rights of minors seeking an abortion and the rights of physi-
cians who perform the abortions.5 One provision requires physicians to
notify both parents of any unemancipated minor, regardless of her ma-
turity or her best interests.
6
Because of the controversial nature of the parental notification re-
quirement, the legislature provided an alternative which allows the mi-
nor to elect a notification "bypass" procedure. 7 The "bypass" procedure
written notice of the pending operation has been delivered in the manner speci-
fied in subdivisions 2 to 4.
(a) The notice shall be addressed to the parent at his usual place of abode
and delivered personally to the parent by the physician or his agent.
(b) In lieu of the delivery required by clause (a), notice shall be made by
certified mail addressed to the parent at his usual place of abode with return
receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee which means postal
employee can only deliver the mail to the authorized addressee. Time of deliv-
ery shall be deemed to occur at 12 o'clock noon on the next day on which regular
mail delivery takes place, subsequent to mailing.
4. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(1) (1982) provides that "[a]ny minor may give effective
consent for medical, mental and other health services to determine the presence of or to
treat pregnancy and conditions associated therewith, venereal disease, alcohol and other
drug abuse, and the consent of no other person is required."
This statute was originally enacted in 1971 and its purpose was to encourage teenag-
ers to seek and receive medical help for sex-related health problems. See Affidavit of Adele
Hoffman at para. 13, Hodgson v. State, 3-81 Civ. No. 538 (D. Minn. filed July 30, 1981);
Affidavit of Tom Webber at para. 12-17, Hodgson v. State, 3-81 Civ. No. 538 (D. Minn.
filed July 30, 1981).
Section 144.343(1) is limited by MINN. STAT. § 144.346 (1982) which provides that
physicians may notify the parent or legal guardian of a minor patient of any treatment
needed or given where "failure to inform the parent or legal guardian would seriously
jeopardize the health of the minor patient." MINN. STAT. § 144.346 (1982).
For prior development of Minnesota law on abortion, see Hodgson v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 614 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1980); Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. State,
612 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1980); Nyberg v. City of Va., 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974); Hodg-
son v. Flakne, 463 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1978); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008
(D. Minn. 1974); Dakota County Welfare Bd. v. State, 261 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1977);
McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1977); Mower County Welfare Bd. v. State, 261
N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1977); State v. Hodgson, 295 Minn. 294, 204 N.W.2d 199 (1973).
5. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 228, 1981 Minn. Laws 1011 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 144.343 (2)-(7) (1982)). The physician is subject to both criminal and civil action if this
statute is violated: "Performance of an abortion in violation of this section shall be a
misdemeanor and shall be grounds for a civil action by a person wrongfully denied notifi-
cation." MINN. STAT. § 144.343(5) (1982).
6. See MINN. STAT. § 144.343(2) (1982).
7. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(6)(c)(i) (1982). Subdivision 6 also provides procedural
protections to ensure a confidential and expeditious "bypass" proceeding:
(ii) Such a pregnant woman may participate in proceedings in the court on
her own behalf, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for her. The
court shall, however, advise her that she has a right to court appointed counsel,
and shall, upon her request, provide her with such counsel.
(iii) Proceedings in the court under this section shall be confidential and
19831
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becomes operative only if the mandatory notification provision is tempo-
rarily or permanently enjoined by judicial order.8 This procedure per-
mits ajudge to authorize the minor's physician to perform an abortion as
long as certain conditions are met. First, if the judge determines that the
pregnant minor is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the
abortion, the physician is authorized to proceed without notifying the
parents. Second, if the minor is not mature, the judge must decide
whether an abortion without parental notification would be in her best
interests. If the judge concludes that the minor's best interests would be
served by an abortion, the physician will be granted authorization to
proceed. 9 The minor's parents are notified of the abortion only where
the judge determines that the minor is not mature and that notification
would be in her best interests.
Parental'O notification is not required in all circumstances. Section
144.343, subdivision 4, provides that notice is not required if the abortion
is necessary to prevent the minor's death and there is insufficient time to
provide the required notice, if the abortion is authorized in writing by
the persons who are entitled to notice, or if the minor is a victim of sexual
shall be given such precedence over other pending matters so that the court may
reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the best interests of
the pregnant woman. A judge of the court who conducts proceedings under this
section shall make in writing specific factual findings and legal conclusions sup-
porting his decision and shall order a record of the evidence to be maintained
including his own findings and conclusions.
(iv) An expedited confidential appeal shall be available to any. such preg-
nant woman for whom the court denies an order authorizing an abortion with-
out notification. An order authorizing an abortibn without notification shall not
be subject to appeal. No filing fees shall be required of any such pregnant wo-
man at either the trial or the appellate level. Access to the trial court for the
purposes of such a petition or motion, and access to the appellate courts for
purposes of making an appeal from denial of the same, shall be afforded such a
pregnant woman 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
MINN. STAT. § 144.343(6)(c)(ii)-(iv) (1982).
8. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(6) (1982).
An action has been brought in federal district court to invalidate the notification
requirement and bypass regulations. Plaintiffs in Hodgson v. State, 3-81 Civ. No. 538 (D.
Minn. filed July 30, 1981), have claimed that the statute unduly burdens a minor's right
to obtain an abortion in violation of the due process clauses of the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions. A temporary restraining order has been issued by Judge Donald
Alsop, enjoining the enforcement of the notification requirement. This determination was
based upon the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision of Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 117-21 and
accompanying text. The bypass procedure became operative on August 1, 1981, and is
presently in effect, but its validity is expected to be litigated sometime during the summer
of 1984. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune, supra note 1, at col. 5.
9. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(c)(i) (1982).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 144.343(3) (1982) which defines "parent" as "both parents of
the pregnant woman if they are both living, one parent of the pregnant woman if only one
is living or if the second one cannot be located through reasonably diligent effort, or the
guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one."
[Vol. 9
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abuse, neglect, or physical abuse."t
This Article will illustrate the hardships that both the notification re-
quirement and the "bypass" procedure of Minnesota Statutes section
144.343 place upon pregnant minors. The first section focuses upon the
historical basis of current abortion laws, including the recent Supreme
Court reaffirmation of prior abortion decisions. The second section ana-
lyzes the constitutionality of section 144.343, by identifying the interests
of and effects on parent, child, and state.
II. HISTORICAL BASIS OF CURRENT ABORTION LAWS
The right to privacy guarantees that an individual may conduct her
personal affairs free from undue interference or regulation by the state. 12
The Supreme Court has stated that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every indi-
vidual to the possession and control of his person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.' 13 Although the fundamental right to privacy is not articulated in
the Constitution, t4 it is grounded in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 15
The United States Supreme Court first enunciated the right to privacy
with respect to childbearing in Griswold o. Connecticut. 16 The Court held
that a state could not prohibit married couples from using contracep-
tives; the prohibition would violate their privacy.17 This application was
expanded in subsequent cases to encompass other personal decisions such
11. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(4)(a) (1982) states:
No notice shall be required under this section if:
(a) The attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman's medical rec-
ord that the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is
insufficient time to provide the required notice; or
(b) The abortion is authorized in writing by the person or persons who are
entitled to notice; or
(c) The pregnant minor woman declares that she is a victim of sexual abuse,
neglect, or physical abuse as defined in section 626.556. Notice of that declara-
tion shall be made to the proper authorities as provided in section 626.556, sub-
division 3.
12. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Foe v. Vanderhoof,
389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975).
13. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Prior to this time, the Court had
grounded the right to privacy in the penumbra of the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amend-
ments. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (first amendment); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (fourth and fifth amendments); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
350 (1967) (fourth and fifth amendments); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (ninth amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (fourteenth amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629-30 (1886)
(fourth and fifth amendments).
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Id at 485-86.
1983]
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as marriage t8 and procreation.19
The right to privacy was extended to a woman's decision to abort in
Roe v. Wade2O and Doe v. Bolton. 21 These two cases establish that a wo-
man has a fundamental right2 2 to choose between obtaining an abortion
or carrying the pregnancy to term. 23 This fundamental right, however,
is not absolute;24 it is subject to regulation if the state can show the exist-
ence of a compelling interest. 2 5 In addition, the regulation must be nar-
rowly constructed to further the compelling interest without
18. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978) (right to marry is a personal
right implicit in fourteenth amendment's due process clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (state statutory scheme preventing marriages on basis of race was unconstitu-
tional). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (parent has right to
bring up children in way acceptable to his own judgment); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (requiring children to attend public schools interferes with parents'
right to direct upbringing and education of child).
19. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute requiring "habitual criminals"
to be sterilized was held unconstitutional). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974) (public school maternity leave rules must not arbitrarily impinge upon
teacher's liberty to make childbearing decisions).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
22. See Casenote, Bellottiv. Baird, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 337, 341 n.40 (1980). The
author states:
A fundamental right is a "specific type of civil liberty" including:
(1) first amendment rights; (2) the right to engage in interstate travel; (3) the
right to vote; (4) the right to fair proceedings before a deprivation of personal
liberty (although this is somewhat unclear); (5) the right to privacy-which in-
cludes some rights to freedom of choice in sexual matters; (6) the right to free-
dom of choice in marriage.
ld
23. The Court founded the right to privacy upon the fourteenth amendment's con-
cept of personal liberty but found the right to be the same if founded upon the ninth
amendment's reservation of rights to the people. Either amendment was broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
24. The Court in Roe v. Wade stated, "We, therefore, conclude that the right of per-
sonal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation." 410 U.S. at 154.
25. The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the mother's health and the life of
the fetus, each interest becoming compelling at different stages of the pregnancy. The
Wade Court summarized its holding as follows:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abor-
tion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.
410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
[Vol. 9
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unnecessarily infringing on the fundamental right. 26
Generally, minors have not been entitled to the same protections as
those guaranteed adults under the Constitution.2 7 States have been al-
lowed greater freedom to regulate the activities of minors in view of the
minor's alleged inability to protect herself and to make well-informed
decisions.28 This alleged vulnerability has led many states to place re-
strictions upon a minor's right to vote and to marry.29 Despite the valid-
ity of these regulations, the United States Supreme Court has expressed
concern regarding the extent of the state's power. 30 The Court has
stated, "the question of the extent of state power to regulate conduct of
minors not constitutionally regulable when committed by adults is a vex-
ing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise answer."31
Roe v. Wade did not address whether the right to privacy with respect
26. 410 U.S. at 155-56. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Georgia abortion
statute held unconstitutional even though it had met the compelling interest requirement,
because it imposed an undue burden on the woman).
27. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (due process requirements do
not require jury trials in state juvenile delinquency proceedings); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (statute prohibiting sale of obscene material to minors was upheld);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state has broader authority over children
than their parents in matters of employment).
28. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979) (Bellotti II) (regulation of minor's
abortion decision was upheld); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-74
(1976) (minor must be sufficiently mature to understand procedure and to make an intelli-
gent assessment of her circumstances); Wynn v. Carey, 482 F.2d 1375, 1384-85 (7th Cir.
1978) (the minor's right to terminate her pregnancy cannot be exercised unless the deci-
sion is informed).
29. See Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d. Cir. 1982) (emancipation is not within the
sole power of the child), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 61 (1982); cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 637-40, 645 (1968) (minors cannot be sold certain obscene materials).
A minor's vulnerability has also been the motivating factor for establishing separate
court systems which deal exclusively with minors. See Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp.
947, 953 (D. Colo. 1975).
30. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
The different tests applied to restrict a minor's privacy rights (significant state inter-
est) and an adult's privacy rights (compelling state interest) provide some flexibility in
application, yet support the proposition that the degree of permissible state regulation
over the minor is far broader than that over the adult. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Butsee Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), where
the Court did not differentiate minors from adults, indicating that the right to privacy is
"the right of the idividual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child." Id. at 453 (emphasis supplied).
31. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977). See, e.g., In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (a minor is entitled to standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"
in criminal proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (a minor is entitled to notice, legal
representation, and an opportunity to confront his accusers in a juvenile proceeding).
19831
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to an abortion extends to minors as well as adults. 32 Consequently, state
legislatures enacted statutes that severely limited the minor's access to
the abortion procedure. 33 Typically, statutes require parental or spousal
consent, 34 with the intent to protect minors from hasty, uninformed deci-
sions and to protect parental rights as well.35 Under these statutes, a
minor must overcome both parental and state interests before she is enti-
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973). The court stated:
North Carolina . . . requires written permission for the abortion from the hus-
band when the woman is a married minor, that is, when she is less than 18 years
of age; . . . if the woman is an unmarried minor, written permission from the
parents is required. We need not now decide whether provisions of this kind are
constitutional.
Id (citations omitted).
33. The statutes requiring that restrictive procedures be met are similar in scope. See,
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1982-83):
(1) If a pregnant woman is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, a
physician shall not perform an abortion upon her unless he first obtains both the
consent of the pregnant woman and that of her parents, except as hereinafter
provided. In deciding whether to grant such consent, a pregnant woman's par-
ents shall consider only their child's best interests. If one of the pregnant wo-
man's parents has died or is unavailable to the physician within a reasonable
time and in a reasonable manner, consent of the remaining parent shall be suffi-
cient. If both parents have died or are otherwise unavailable to the physician in
a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, consent of the pregnant woman's
guardian or guardians shall be sufficient. If the pregnant woman's parents are
divorced, consent of the parent having custody shall be sufficient. If a pregnant
woman less than eighteen years of age has not married and if one or both of her
parents or guardians refuse to consent to the performance of an abortion, or if
she elects not to seek the consent of one or both of her parents or guardians, a
judge of the superior court department of the trial court shall, upon petition, or
motion, and after an appropriate hearing, authorize a physician to perform the
abortion if said judge determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capa-
ble of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion or, if said judge deter-
mines that she is not mature, that the performance of an abortion upon her
would be in her best interests. A pregnant woman less than eighteen years of age
may participate in proceedings in the superior court department of the trial
court on her own behalf, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for her.
The court shall, however, advise her that she has a right to court appointed
counsel, and shall, upon her request, provide her with such counsel. Proceedings
in the superior court department of the trial court under this section shall be
confidential and shall be given such precedence over other pending matters that
the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the
best interests of the pregnant woman. A judge of the superior court department
of the trial court who conducts proceedings under this section shall make in writ-
ing specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting his decision and
shall order a record of the evidence to be maintained including his own findings
and conclusions.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (1973) states:
'Justified medical termination' means the intentional ending of the pregnancy of
a woman at the request of said woman or, if said woman is under the age of
eighteen years, then at the request of the woman and her then living parent or
guardian, or, if the woman is married and living with her husband, by a licensed
physician using accepted medical procedures in a licensed hospital upon written
certification.
34. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 33.
35. Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D. Colo. 1975).
[Vol. 9
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tied to assert the right to make basic decisions without interference from
others.
Courts systematically struck down consent statutes as unconstitutional
because they infringed upon the fundamental right established in Roe v.
Wade. 36 These decisions hold that the right to privacy in regard to an
abortion decision does extend to minors.37 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the parental consent issue in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 38 The
Danforth Court held a Missouri statute invalid because "the State does
not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute,
and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for
withholding the consent." 39 The Court recognized the state interest of
protecting the family unit and parental authority which was advanced
by proponents of the statute, but held that the veto power would not
strengthen this interest. The very existence of the pregnancy indicated
that the family structure was already fractured. 4o Because the minor
bears the child and is more directly affected by the pregnancy, the Court
held that the minor's right to privacy outweighs the parent's interest in
termination of the pregnancy.
4 1
The Danforth holding, however, was limited. The Supreme Court
stated that it did not mean to imply that the state may not impose any
restrictions on the minors.42 The Court emphasized that the Missouri
statute was faulty because the veto provision operated as a prerequisite to
the minor's termination of her pregnancy without a sufficient justifica-
tion for the restriction.43
Bellotti v. Bat'rd 44 continued the inquiry into the minor's abortion deci-
36. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa.
1975), affdsub nom., Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976); Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389
F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974),
modified, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
37. See Poe v. Gerstein, 417 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), affdsub nom., Gerstein v. Coe,
428 U.S. 901 (1976); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (1975),
aftd sub noma., Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976); Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F.
Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), modi-
fied, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aft',
428 U.S. 901 (1976); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Washington v.
Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
38. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
39. Id at 74.




44. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II). Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I)
was originally a companion case to Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
In Belloul I, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision which held the con-
sent statute unconstitutional, stating that the district court should have abstained and
certified issues concerning the meaning of the statute to the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
1983]
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sion and the extent of regulation allowed by the state. The Supreme
Court struck down the Massachusetts consent statute, 45 stating that it fell
short of satisfying constitutional standards in two respects:
First, it permits judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld
from a minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and fully
competent to make this decision independently. Second, it requires pa-
rental consultation or notification in every instance, without affording
the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an independent judicial
determination that she is mature enough to consent or that an abortion
would be in her best interests. 46
The effect of the Court's decision is that every minor must have the op-
portunity to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying
her parents.
4 7
The Bellouui Court further stated that the requirement of obtaining pa-
rental consent does not unduly burden a minor's right to seek an abor-
tion, as long as an alternative procedure is provided for obtaining
authorization for the abortion.48 The Court suggested that in order to
obtain authorization, the minor may show that she is sufficiently mature
and well informed to make an independent decision, or if unable to make
an independent decision, that the abortion would be in her best
interests.4
9
In addition, the Court warned that in developing restrictions on the
minor's abortion decision, states must provide certain procedural safe-
cial Court. On remand, the specific questions were certified to the supreme judicial court
and, based on its holdings, the district court then declared the statute unconstitutional.
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978). BblotiII refers to this case on appeal
from the district court.
45. See supra note 34.
46. 443 U.S. at 651.
47. Id. at 647.
48. Id. at 643. The Court's rationale for this holding is that "the unique nature and
consequences of the abortion decision make it inappropriate 'to give a third party an
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to
terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.'
Id (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
49. 443 U.S. at 643-44. The Court acknowledged the significance of the abortion
decision, putting aside religious and ethical considerations, indirectly expressed that an
abortion may be less burdensome and emotionally detrimental for the minor than raising
a child:
[Tihe potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman. is not miti-
gated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable education, employ-
ment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood
may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of
the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the termination of the
legal disabilities of minority. In sum, there are few situations in which denying a





et al.: The Abortion Decision for Minnesota Minors: Who Decides?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1983
THE ABORTION DECISION
guards for the minor.50 Those safeguards expressly indicated were that
the third party decision be made quickly5  and that the issue be com-
pleted with anonymity.52 These procedural safeguards coupled with the
suggested authorization procedure shift the veto power with which the
Court was concerned in Danforth from the minor's parents to the court.
53
The United States Supreme Court recently considered the parental
notification requirement for minors seeking an abortion in HL. v. Mathe-
son. 54 The contested Utah statute required a physician to "[n]otify, if
possible" the parents or guardian of a minor.55 After discussing the im-
plications of its prior abortion decisions, the Court held that because the
appellant did not allege that she was mature or emancipated, she lacked
standing to challenge the statute as unconstitutional on grounds of over-
breadth.56 Because of the defective pleadings, the Court addressed only
the facial constitutionality of a statute requiring a physician to give
notice to parents "if possible," prior to performing an abortion on their
minor daughter, (a) when the girl is living with and dependent upon
50. Id at 644. The Court stated:
The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of
the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity
and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to
be obtained. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision requiring
parental consent does not in fact amount to the "absolute, and possibly arbi-
trary, veto" that was found impermissible in Danforth.
Id (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)). Se supra note 49.
51. 443 U.S. at 644. If the judicial authorization process extends beyond the three-
month stage established in Roe v. Wade, the state's interest in protecting the mother be-
comes compelling, and regulation becomes permissible. See supra note 24.
52. 443 U.S. at 644. A judicial authorization process that is not anonymous will deter
minors from using a medically safe procedure and instead cause them to resort to illegal
abortions.
53. The Court in Danforth stated:
[T]he State may not impose a blanket provision, ... requiring the consent of a
parent or person in locoparentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor
during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy. Just as with the requirement of con-
sent from the spouse, so here, the State does not have the constitutional authority
to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of
the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of
the reason for withholding the consent.
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
54. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
55. Id. at 399-400. The Utah statute provides:
To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment, he shall:
(1) Consider all factors relevant to the well- being of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed including, but not limited to,
(a) Her physical, emotional and psychological health and safety,
(b) Her age,
(c) Her familial situation.
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if
she is married.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978).
56. 450 U.S. 398, 406 (1981).
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her parents, (b) when she is not emancipated by marriage or otherwise,
and (c) when she has made no claim or showing as to her maturity or
as to her relations with her parents.
5 7
The parental notification issue was not squarely addressed.
58
Matheson provides all states, however, with further clarification of the
Bellotti decision. The Court stated,
As applied to immature and dependent minors, the statute plainly
serves the important considerations of family integrity and protecting
adolescents which we identified in Bellotti II In addition, as applied to
that class, the statute serves a significant state interest by providing an
opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other informa-
tion to a physician.
59
The Court seems to suggest that its holding is limited to immature, de-
pendent minors; it did not reach the question of whether the statute can
be construed to apply to all unmarried minor girls, including those who
are mature and emancipated.60
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its decision of Roe v. Wade in
three comparison cases, 6 1 which signalled an end to speculation that the
Court was retreating from its controversial trimester system. 62 In City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,63 the Supreme Court
struck down a city ordinance that placed numerous restrictions on a wo-
man's access to abortion. The Court stated that the Roe decision had
57. Id. at 407.
58. See Justice Stevens' opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens stated
that this appeal squarely addressed the constitutionality of parental notification require-
ments for a minor to obtain an abortion, but that the Court decided the narrower ques-
tion presented by the appellant's fact situation. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment).
59. Id. at 411 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
60. See supra note 59.
61. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); Simopoulos v. Vir-
ginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
62. See Annas, Roe v. Wade Reaffimed, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (1983) in which
the author states: "those commentators who, like me, interpreted [the government fund-
ing cases] as signaling a retreat from Roe v. Wade, have now been proven incorrect." Id at
21. The "government funding cases" include Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, reh. denied
448 U.S. 917 (1980), Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, reh. denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980),
and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
In Maher, the Supreme Court upheld a state restriction on funds for elective abortions
by holding that providing medicaid benefits only when an abortion is medically necessary
did not burden the right to an abortion. Id. at 466. In Harris, the Supreme Court sus-
tained a rider to the Hyde Amendment that restricted fund disbursement for abortions
even if performed to preserve maternal health. 448 U.S. at 316-17. See Horan & Marzen,
The Supreme Court on Abortion Funding. The Second Time Around, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 411, 412
(1981). The Court upheld a similar amendment to an Illinois medicaid law in the Wi-
hams decision. Id. at 411.
63. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
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been "considered with special care"64 and that according to principles of
stare decisis it would not ignore precedence65 by upholding, among
others, a blanket hospitalization requirement, "informed consent" re-
quirement, and a parental-court consent requirement for minors.66 In
Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcrof, 6 7 the Supreme Court consistently
struck down a Missouri statute that required abortions at the end of the
first trimester to be performed in a hospital. 68 The Court also struck
down some other statutory requirements,69 but upheld an alternative ju-
dicial procedure that first determines whether the minor is mature
enough to make the abortion decision on her own, thereby satisfying the
City of Akron, Bellotti, and Danforth standard that there not be a blanket
consent provision as a prerequisite for obtaining an abortion. 70
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MINNESOTA STATUTE SECTION
144.343
A. Parental Notification Requirement
1 Interests of Parent, Child, and State
Parental notification statutes raise the question of who knows best how
to rear children-the parents or the state-and to what extent children
should participate in issues having an impact upon their development.
Traditionally, states have applied a doctrine of non-intervention into
matters that intimately concern relations between parent and child.71 In
1944, the Supreme Court stated that "the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
64. Id. at 2487 n. 1.
65. Id. "We think it prudent ... to retain Roe's identification of the beginning of the
second trimester as the appropriate time at which the State's interest in maternal health
becomes sufficiently compelling to justify significant regulation of abortion." Id at 2505
n. 1l.
66. See id. at 2494, 2499, 2504 (requirement that abortions performed subsequent to
end of first trimester be performed in a hospital struck down; prohibition against physi-
cians performing abortion on minors under age of 15 unless written consent from parents
or court is obtained struck down; requirements that physician inform patient of status of
pregnancy, development of fetus, date of possible viability, physical and emotional com-
plications of abortion and particular risks of individual's pregnancy, and abortion tech-
nique struck down; statute using term "humane" deemed vague as definition of criminal
conduct in context of requirement that physicians "insure that the remains of the unborn
child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner").
67. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
68. Id. at 2520.
69. See 103 S. Ct. at 2522 (invalidating statute requiring a second physician to attend
the abortion of a viable fetus).
70. See 103 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
71. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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der."' 72 The rationale for non-intervention is multifaceted: parents are
able to establish and maintain critical family bonds. 73 In addition, the
law does not have the capacity to supervise the fragile parent-child
relationship.
74
Despite the preference for non-intervention, the family is not beyond
regulation.75 The right of the parent is not absolute where public safety
or harm to the child is imminent. The state interests may in those in-
stances override the parents' right to control the upbringing of the
child.76 In Bellottz, the Supreme Court identified three significant state
interests regarding the minor's abortion rights. 77 The first is the peculiar
vulnerability of children. 78 The Court stated that "the State is entitled
to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their
needs for 'concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.' "79 The
second interest is the minor's inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner.80 The Court has held that states may "limit
the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of impor-
tant, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences." 8 1 The
third interest is the importance of the parental role in childrearing.8
2
The state is allowed to place restrictions upon the child in order to pro-
mote the parent-child relationship and to teach the minor to become a
mature, socially responsible adult.83 Therefore, non-intervention is not
the only means for securing the parent-child relationship; intervention
by the state is also an aid for nurturing these roles.
In developing laws to maintain a healthy parental role in childrearing,
the courts focus on the parents' rights in the upbringing of their child
72. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
73. See Freeman, Parents, Child-Rearing and the State. Who Knows Best?, 130 NEW L.J.
1133, 1133 (1980).
74. See id. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
75. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
76. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), af'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964 (1976).
77. The statement must establish a significant state interest, rather than a compelling
interest, for a state regulation placed upon a minor's fundamental right to pass constitu-
tional muster. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). See Note, The
Minor's Right of Privacy. Limitations on State Action After Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1216, 1232 n.88 (1977) where the'author advocates the use of the compelling interest
standard for both minors and adults. Minors, however, are subject to a greater number of
regulations, because the regulations may be compelling for minors but not for adults. Id
78. 443 U.S. at 634.
79. Id at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
80. 443 U.S. at 635.
81. Id
82. Id. at 637.
83. Id. at 638.
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rather than on the child's right to make her own decisions.84 The child,
however, has constitutionally protected rights that may not be infringed
by either parent or state. Determining these protected rights involves the
use of a balancing test.85 The question becomes whether the parents'
and states' interests outweigh the minor's rights to privacy, due process,
and equal protection.
Parental notification statutes attempt to address the three significant
state interests and, in particular, ensure that a minor's abortion decision
will be well-reasoned and informed. 86 A minor faced with unwanted
pregnancy may be confused and frightened.87 The Danforth Court
stated, "The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stress-
ful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full
knowledge of its nature and its consequences."88
Three arguments undermine the basis of the Supreme Court's decision
in Bellott'. First, it is questionable whether a blanket notification require-
ment, such as that embodied in Minnesota Statutes section 144.343, sub-
division 2, which distinguishes between emancipated and
unemancipated minors, but not mature and immature minors, achieves
the above objective.8 9 Courts have recognized that "[m]arried minors
84. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
85. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 567 (E.D. Pa.
1975) in which the court states:
Where there is . . . a potential conflict between the interests of the child and
other possible interests of the parent, the state cannot statutorily mandate that
the parent must always prevail, for parental consent may not simply be unilater-
aly substituted for consent of the child; particularly, where as here, the funda-
mental right is infringed without affording the child any rights of due process.
Id
86. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1978).
87. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
88. Id. at 67 (opinion of the court). In his concurrence Justice Stewart noted:
There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissi-
ble end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and ad-
vice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear
a child. That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional
stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional sup-
port. It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support from
the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant mi-
nors frequently take place.
Id. at 91 (footnote omitted).
89. In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the Supreme Court addressed the facial
constitutionality of a statute requiring a physician to give notice to parents of a pregnant
minor wanting an abortion. See id. at 407 (1981); supra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text. The Court limited the issue and subsequent holding to the situation in which the
minor is living at home, unemancipated, and there has been no showing of maturity. 450
U.S. at 407. In Planned Parenthood, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983), the Supreme Court notes the
limited holding of Matheson and that Planned Parenthood did not address the notification
19831
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are not necessarily more mature and responsible than their unmarried
contemporaries. '"90 Parental guidance is undermined when a significant
number of minors are not afforded the protection of informed decisions
and where a statute distinguishes between married and unmarried mi-
nors without justification for the distinction.9 '
Second, the lack of distinction between mature and immature minors
infringes upon the right of privacy, which has been defined in part as a
right to autonomy in decision-making. 92 The right of privacy includes
the right to make wrong decisions as well as correct ones93 and should
not be regulated in accordance with state-determined notions of correct-
ness. 94 Requiring mature minors to notify parents of an abortion deci-
sion in order to obtain information and advice creates a presumption of
incompetence to decide.
95
Third, pregnant minors are not less capable of deciding whether to
terminate their pregnancies than they are to decide whether to carry
them to term.96 In fact, medical evidence indicates that a full-term preg-
nancy has far more serious physical developmental consequences on a
minor than does an abortion.9 7 Thus, a blanket notification requirement
such as Minnesota Statutes section 144.343, subdivision 2, does not neces-
sarily achieve well-reasoned and informed abortion decisions.
Parental notification statutes also attempt to preserve the family unit
by safeguarding the societal role the parent plays in supervising uneman-
cipated minor children. In Ginsberg v. New York, 98 the Court recognized
that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing
issue, although the lower courts had found the notice requirement unconstitutional. See
id at 2525 n.17. The C'ty of Akron decision also did not address the notification issue,
although in that case, the lower court upheld the notice requirement. See 103 S. Ct. at
2497 n.29.
90. State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260, 267 (1975);see Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 73-74.
91. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1387 (7th Cir. 1978).
92. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965).
93. See Note, supra note 77, at 1235.
94. Id at 1235-36.
95. Compare the notification requirement concerning abortions of MINN. STAT.
§ 144.343(2) (1982) to MINN. STAT. § 144.343(1) (1982) which does not require notifica-
tion for minors desiring "medical, mental and other health services to determine the pres-
ence of or to treat pregnancy and conditions associated therewith, venereal disease,
alcohol and other drug abuse." Id.
96. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1387 (7th Cir. 1978).
97. See Affidavit of Jane Hodgson, M.D.,supra note 1, at para. 27. Comparing birth-
related mortality with abortion- related mortality, statistics show that the risk that a teen-
ager has from pregnancy continuation is more than five times the risk from abortion.
98. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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of their children is basic in the structure of society." 99 This significant
state interest is limited, however, because a state can protect these child-
rearing rights only without unduly restricting the minor's rights.' 0 0
Several jurisdictions have found the protection of parental rights inad-
equate to justify restricting the minor's abortion rights, because parents
will often oppose a decision to abort regardless of the minor's best inter-
ests.' 0 1 In the Belloti majority opinion, Justice Powell stated, "many
parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and young pregnant
minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to
their parents' efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to
court."102 Minors, afraid of their parents' strong reactions, may resort to
alternatives that both the state and parents wish to avert. 0 3
That a minor's best interests may be compromised can also be evi-
denced from her refusal to seek medical help. Delayed medical attention
increases the physical risks involved with abortion and may foreclose the
abortion alternative altogether.104 Minors may seek illegal abortions or
try to self-induce an abortion; both alternatives are significantly more
dangerous than a legal abortion. 0 5 Thus, teenagers will go to great
lengths to avoid letting their parents know, and the result is that in at-




Having identified problems inherent in statutes requiring parental no-
99. Id at 639. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d
1162, 1167 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980).
100. The Supreme Court has indicated that parental rights should receive protection
absent a "powerful countervailing interest." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
101. See Dembitz, The Supreme Court and a Mthzor's Abortzn Declsion, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1251, 1255 (1980) in which the author states:
In my observation, mothers who have opposed their unmarried daughters' efforts
to secure abortions variously have expressed a vengeful desire to punish the
daughter for her sexual activity by making her suffer the unwanted child, a fer-
vor to impose a religious conviction the mother has failed to instill in her daugh-
ter, a hope of caring for her daughter's baby as her own because of an inability
or unwillingness to bear another child herself, a defensive or resentful attitude
because she bore illegitimate children without seeking or being able to secure an
abortion, or a general distaste for abortion.
Id (footnotes omitted).
102. 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979).
103. See Dembitz, supra note 101, at 1263; 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 337, 361 (1980).
104. See Affidavit of Jane Hodgson, M.D., supra note 1, at para. 7.
105. Id
106. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction, at 10 n.13, Hodgson v. State, 3-81 Civ. No. 538 (D.
Minn., filed July 30, 1981). "Many prestigious medical and professional groups in Minne-
sota [who] testified against [MINN. STAT. § 144.343], point out that it was medically ill-
advised, contrary to good public health policy, and would not achieve any alleged benefi-
cial effect of helping family communication." Id
19831
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tification, it is helpful to analyze the specific ramifications of Minnesota
Statutes section 144.343 on Minnesota minors.
First, the 48-hour waiting period imposed upon Minnesota minors
raises due process considerations. The waiting period, which is inter-
twined with the mandatory notice to parents, became part of the statute
in order to further the significant interests set out by Bellott 107 Section
144.343 provides an adequate period for counseling and discussion be-
tween parents and child.108 A mandatory wait, however, represents a
direct interference with an individual's right to choose an abortion.109
Several jurisdictions have addressed this issue and have struck down10
the operation of such waiting periods. Importantly, those courts that
struck down waiting periods addressed the issue as applied to adult, ma-
ture women, not minors. In City of Akron, the Supreme Court stated that
the state does not have "unreviewable authority to decide what informa-
tion a woman must be given before she chooses to have an abortion," ' t I
but that this responsibility lies with the physician so that the state does
not influence the woman's informed choice between abortion and child-
birth.1 2 The City of Akron Court did distinguish, in a footnote, a special
state interest in protecting immature minors by ensuring that the deci-
107. See supra notes 49-52.
108. The intent behind the 48 hour waiting period, in addition to providing an "ade-
quate" counseling period (which in fact is probably not enough time for a concerned
parent to provide adequate information and counseling), may be to provide enough time
for the parent to thwart any plans the minor may have to obtain the abortion. The parent
is given some time to advise the minor, but is given more than enough time to ban the
minor from all means of transportation, remove all access to financial resources, and re-
move the minor from her sources of pro-abortive support, friends, and other parent-type
figures.
109. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 866, modified 664 F.2d
687 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'don othergrounds, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983), which held that a 48 hour
waiting requirement was unconstitutional. The Ashcrofi court noted that H.L. v. Mathe-
son, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), recognized that time is likely to be of the essence in abortion
decisions; the statute which the Supreme Court reviewed in Matheson did not provide a
mandatory waiting period. See Ashcrofl, 655 F.2d at 866 n.31.
110. See Womens Services, P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded, 452 U.S. 911 (1981) (for further consideration in light of H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398 (1981)), aft'd, 690 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1982); Charles v. Corey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th
Cir. 1980) (24 hour waiting period); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); Wolfe v.
Schroering, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (24 hour waiting period); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F.
Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.),
modified, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); Mar-
garet S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (D. La. 1980) (24 hour waiting period).
111. 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
112. Id. But see Maher v. Roe, 448 U.S. 358 (1980), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980), in which the Supreme Court upheld governmental spending that reimbursed
indigent women for childbirth but not abortion. This preference was permissible because
it did not add any "restriction on access to abortion that was not already there." City of
Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2500 n.33 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
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sion is carefully considered and well-reasoned.l13 Therefore, section
144.343, despite the adult-minor distinction, may still be invalid because
it does not distinguish between mature and immature minors.
One authority believes that the waiting period results not only in inac-
tion for 48 hours, but may ultimately result in a complete obstacle for
some minors.' 14 It may necessitate more than one trip to the Twin Cities
or Duluth, which are the areas generally selected by out-state minors due
to inadequacies in local court systems.' 15 It may increase both mental
anguish and health risks." 6 This is particularly true of a minor whose
pregnancy extends into the second trimester, and who must then seek out
a provider in Minneapolis.'17
Second, the requirement that both parents be notified, regardless of the
existing marital status of the parents or other relevant factors, may un-
duly burden many minors.'18 To involve a non-custodial parent who
has long been removed from any familial role due to divorce or separa-
tion may create a stressful situation for both the minor and the custodial
parent, and merits little significance in light of the Bellotti interests.' 19 In
addition, it is possible that one parent's whereabouts cannot be ascer-
tained. Section 144.343, subdivision 3, requires that the parents be lo-
cated through "reasonably diligent effort," but gives no guidance as to
what is considered reasonable diligence.120
The preceding considerations illustrate that due to the vulnerability of
the pregnant minor, the notification requirement of Minnesota Statutes
section 144.343 will probably not be upheld by the court in the recently
113. 103 S. Ct. at 2500 n.32.
114. See Affidavit of Jane Hodgson, M.D., supra note 1, at para. 42.
115. See generally id. at para. 35-47.
116. See id. at para. 43. See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. at 2525 n.16, in
which the Supreme Court recognized that time may be of the essence regarding obtaining
an abortion.
117. Dr. Hodgson states,
Access to abortion services is extremely difficult for all women in Minnesota.
The major providers are in the Minneapolis area, although a clinic has opened
up in Duluth this April, 1981. All women who are over twelve weeks pregnant
have to travel to Minneapolis, since those procedures are done only there.
Affidavit of Jane Hodgson, M.D., supra note 1, at para. 30.
118. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979).
119. The rationale behind encouraging minors to discuss their pregnancy with parents
is to promote family unity and harmony, although this does not necessarily occur. See
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 204-05 (E.D. La. 1980). Assuming that it does,
it seems ironic that a noncustodial parent who may have long given up on maintaining a
friendly relationship with the custodial parent or minor, is required to become a party to
such a conflict. Such notification might only destroy family unity and harmony.
120. Also, the statute does not address who must make the diligent effort to locate the
parent. Is it the other parent? Is it the physician? And what is the result if a located
parent is unwilling to divulge the location of the unnotified parent? The requirements of
notice raise many procedural problems that render the requirement virtually impossible to
satisfy under many circumstances.
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filed case of Hodgson v. State. 121 This requirement imposes an undue bur-
den upon the minor's exercise of her constitutional right to have an abor-
tion as indicated by the Bellotti decision and the more recent decisions of
City of Akron, and Planned Parenthood Association.
B. The Bypass Procedure
The inquiry into state interests and a minor's abortion rights does not
end with the notification issue posed by Minnesota Statutes section
144.343. Subdivision 6 of the statute allows for a judicial procedure that
circumvents notification in the event the latter is found to be
unconstitutional. 122
The Bellotti Court addressed the bypass issue by holding that "every
minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a
court without first consulting or notifying her parents."123 The Court
formulated a procedure that once a minor appeared in court would be
satisfactory:
If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to
make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must
authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent. If she
fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision
independently, she must be permitted to show that an abortion never-
theless would be in her best interests. If the court is persuaded that it
is, the court must authorize the abortion. If, however, the court is not
persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abortion would
be in her best interests, it may decline to sanction the operation. 124
This bypass procedure takes into account family considerations, as well
as the state interest of encouraging a family, rather than judicial, resolu-
tion of the minor's abortion decision, by requiring the court to determine
whether the abortion would be in the minor's best interests.i25 The Bel-
lotti Court concludes that "the constitutional right to seek an abortion
may not be unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial
access to court."126 The resolution of the issue must be completed with
"anonymity and sufficient expedition" to assure that the abortion is ef-
fectively obtained. 127
Section 144.343, subdivision 6, is structured to meet the requirements
of Bellotti. 128 Yet, whether it meets the state-interests standard of pro-
121. See supra note 8.
122. See supra note 7.
123. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
124. Id at 647-48.
125. Id at 648.
126. Id
127. Id. at 644. "[T]he procedure must ensure that the provision . . . does not in fact
amount to the 'absolute and possibly arbitrary, veto' that was found impermissible in
Danforth." Id
128. See supra note 7.
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tecting the vulnerability of minors is doubtful. 129 Courts may have diffi-
culty in meeting the requirements, particularly in out-state counties, due
to informal court procedures.130 Confidentiality is also difficult to en-
sure, and delays occur regularly due to a lack of filing procedures and the
refusal of judges to hear petitions because they are personally opposed to
abortion.131 For these reasons, many minors prefer to use Hennepin and
Ramsey County courts. 132 Yet, the minor's attempt to utilize a court
system that more adequately guarantees her right to privacy in the pro-
cedural aspects, indicates her right to privacy is hindered in other ways.
Travel may necessitate more than one trip to the Twin Cities and there-
fore delay her ability to obtain an abortion.133 For the minor attending
school and living 200 miles from the Twin Cities, travel may present a
confidentiality problem.
The two remaining problems are of equal concern. First, minors are
not knowledgeable about court proceedings. Therefore, requiring judi-
cial approval for an abortion could deter them from making a reasonable
and expeditious decision. 134 Second, judges faced with deciding whether
to grant judicial approval must determine whether a minor is mature.
Since the legislature has given no guidelines for determining maturity
within the statute, the judge's determination may be as arbitrary as the
parents'. 135
Although Bellotti clearly sets forth the standard to be used for the judi-
cial bypass procedure, factual guidelines were not enunciated by the
Court. Lower courts were given the task of determining the constitu-
tional validity of certain procedures, including how to determine
whether a minor is immature or mature, and what is required for ano-
nymity and expedience. Both City of Akron and Planned Parenthood Associa-
tion reaffirm the Bellotti standard 136 and clarify the constitutional
requirements that must be met by a judicial bypass procedure. The clar-
ification lies in distinguishing the Cty of Akron ordinance, which was
129. Procedural barriers perpetuate the "Scarlet Letter" attitude that our society has
toward premarital pregnancy. One underlying state interest that contributed to the intro-
duction of parental notification statutes is the prevention of teenage sexual activity and
pregnancies. See Comment, Parental Notification: A State-Created Obstacle to a Minor Woman's
Right of Privacy, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 579, 598 (1982). Many believe that the rise
in teenage sexual activity is due to accessible abortion, see id., and so barriers are set to
deter minors from making a decision to abort.
130. Quaere, Nov., 1981, at 7, col. 1.
131. Id at col. 2.
132. Id.
133. See Affidavit of Jane Hodgson, M.D., supra note 1, at para. 31, which states that
"travel means delay, increased costs, missing work or school, some increased physical risks,
and increase in anxiety, stress, and fear ... and an increased risk that prolonged absence
from home or work will destroy the privacy sought regarding the abortion." Id.
134. See id at para. 8.
135. Quaere, Nov., 1981, at 7, col. 1.
136. See City of Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497; Planned Parenthood Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. at 2525.
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struck down, from the Planned Parenthood Association statute, which was
upheld. These distinctions, and other statements made by the Court,
illustrate that the foregoing difficulties are probably not significant
enough to cause Minnesota Statutes section 144.343, subdivision 6, to be
struck down.
In City of Akron, the ordinance in question prohibited a physician from
performing an abortion on a minor under the age of fifteen unless the
physician obtained written consent from the parents or a court order that
the abortion be performed.13 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court decision on the basis that the ordinance did not meet the Bellotti
standard because the City had established an absolute parental veto pro-
vision,138 and did not provide an alternative determination of matur-
ity.139 The Court stated that "it is clear that Akron may not make a
blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15 are too imma-
ture to make this decision or that an abortion never may be in the mi-
nor's best interests without parental approval."140
In Planned Parenthood Association, the statute in question did provide for
an initial determination of maturity.141 For this reason, the Supreme
Court, consistent with City of Akron, upheld the statute.1 42 Clearly, there-
fore, for a judicial bypass (or consent substitute) provision to be valid,
"the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant
minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the abor-
tion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would
be in her best interests."143
Minnesota Statutes section 144.343, subdivision 6, clearly satisfies this
137. See AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.05(B) (1978). The
ordinance states:
(B) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a minor pregnant
woman under the age of fifteen (15) years without first having obtained the in-
formed written consent of the minor pregnant woman in accordance with Sec-
tion 1870.06 of this Chapter, and
(1) First having obtained the informed written consent of one of her parents
or her legal guardian in accordance with Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, or
(2) The minor pregnant woman first having obtained an order from a court
having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed or induced.
Id
138. See City of Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497.
139. See id. at 2498.
140. Id.
141. See Planned Parenthood As'n, 103 S. Ct. at 2526. The statute provides:
(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:
(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the
abortion; or
(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give judicial
consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is denied[.]
Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028.2(4) (Supp. 1982).
142. See 103 S. Ct. at 2526.
143. 103 S. Ct. at 2498; see also Be/lotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
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standard because it provides that the judge determine whether the minor
is mature and, if not, whether an abortion would be in her best inter-
ests. 144 The statute, nonetheless, may still be unlawful because Bellotti
also required that the judicial bypass procedure "be completed with ano-
nymity and sufficient expedition to provide an opportunity for an abor-
tion to be obtained."'' 45 In the Planned Parenthood Association, the Court
discussed this requirement, in a footnote, and stated that the Missouri
statute in question satisfied the anonymity and expedition requirement
because the minor is allowed to use her initials on the petition and ap-
peal of the court decision is to take place within five days from the filing
of the appeal notice. 146 The Minnesota statute merely requires anonym-
ity and expeditiousness, but does not set forth the procedures for meeting
the test. Therefore, as discussed earlier, it is very possible that the proce-
dures will be neither confidential nor expedient.
IV. CONCLUSION
Minnesota Statutes section 144.343 will have a significant impact
upon pregnant minors. If the parental notification requirement is found
to be unconstitutional and the bypass procedure is upheld, minors will
still have to grapple with obtaining judicial approval.
The primary issue is whether the consenting body shall be the court or
the minor's parents. Either one presents obstacles to the frightened mi-
nor that affect her abortion rights. Parents may become too emotionally
reactive to make a sound decision for the child, while the court may be
too detached. The existence of these realities suggests that abortion law
in this state will undergo changes in the near future as legislators con-
tinue the battle over the rights of parents, child, and state.
144. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
145. 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979).
146. See 103 S. Ct. at 2525 n.16.
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